diff options
| author | Patrick J Volkerding <volkerdi@slackware.com> | 2019-01-09 03:21:06 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Hameleers <alien@slackware.com> | 2019-01-09 08:59:41 +0100 |
| commit | 1e8ea1d7ed43fc66a7452dfa0557f42aa3916aea (patch) | |
| tree | 8050be1a6e0f2c3f07d8e697ef1c1b3cd503281e /source/n | |
| parent | 870284c8649cc95fed6d9bd8e1bb5a2b9ac64e84 (diff) | |
| download | current-1e8ea1d7ed43fc66a7452dfa0557f42aa3916aea.tar.gz | |
Wed Jan 9 03:21:06 UTC 201920190109032106
ap/alsa-utils-1.1.8-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
ap/gutenprint-5.3.1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
Shared library .so-version bump.
l/alsa-lib-1.1.8-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
l/alsa-oss-1.1.8-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
l/alsa-plugins-1.1.8-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded.
extra/pure-alsa-system/alsa-lib-1.1.8-x86_64-1_alsa.txz: Upgraded.
extra/pure-alsa-system/alsa-plugins-1.1.8-x86_64-1_alsa.txz: Upgraded.
Diffstat (limited to 'source/n')
24 files changed, 760 insertions, 1643 deletions
diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 72768486..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> -Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake - -Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame -processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids -issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing -same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and -also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed -frames on RX side. - -This issue was introduced by the commit -0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in -authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple -times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is -needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt -failed. - -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> ---- - src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ - src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- - src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ - src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + - 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -index 4e04169..333035f 100644 ---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c -@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - { - struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; - struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; -+ int set = 1; - - /* - * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and -@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but - * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that - * does not support full AP client state. -+ * -+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the -+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for -+ * the same key. - */ -- if (!sta->added_unassoc) -+ if (!sta->added_unassoc && -+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || -+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); -+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); -+ set = 0; -+ } - - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N - if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) -@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, - sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, - sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, - sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, -- sta->added_unassoc)) { -+ set)) { - hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, - HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, - "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", -- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); -+ set ? "set" : "add"); - - if (sta->added_unassoc) { - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -index 3587086..707971d 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event) - #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ - break; - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ -+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; -+ return 0; - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R -@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) - } - - -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) -+{ -+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) -+ return 0; -+ return sm->tk_already_set; -+} -+ -+ - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) - { -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h -index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h -@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, - u8 *data, size_t data_len); - enum wpa_event { - WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, -- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT -+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED - }; - void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); -@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c -index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c -@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) - return; - } - -+ if (sm->tk_already_set) { -+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX -+ * PN in the driver */ -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); -+ return; -+ } -+ - /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail - * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only - * after association has been completed. This function will be called -@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) - - /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ - sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; -+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; - } - - -@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, - - sm->pairwise = pairwise; - sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; - wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); - - buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h -index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h -@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { - struct wpa_ptk PTK; - Boolean PTK_valid; - Boolean pairwise_set; -+ Boolean tk_already_set; - int keycount; - Boolean Pair; - struct wpa_key_replay_counter { --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1802d664..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,250 +0,0 @@ -From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key - -Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a -(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do -not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an -attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the -sequence counter associated to the group key. - -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> ---- - src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ - 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h -index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h -@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { - size_t tk_len; - }; - -+struct wpa_gtk { -+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; -+ size_t gtk_len; -+}; -+ -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+struct wpa_igtk { -+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; -+ size_t igtk_len; -+}; -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - - /* WPA IE version 1 - * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; - u8 gtk_buf[32]; - -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", -+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", -@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - } - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); - -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); -+ - return 0; - } - -@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - } - - -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) -+{ -+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); -+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); -+ -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", -+ keyidx); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, -+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", -+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); -+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); -+ if (keyidx > 4095) { -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), -+ broadcast_ether_addr, -+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), -+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ -+ -+ - static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, - struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) - { -@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, - if (ie->igtk) { - size_t len; - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; -- u16 keyidx; -+ - len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); - if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) - return -1; -+ - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); -- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " -- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", -- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", -- igtk->igtk, len); -- if (keyidx > 4095) { -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); -- return -1; -- } -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), -- broadcast_ether_addr, -- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), -- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, -- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) - return -1; -- } - } - - return 0; -@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) - */ - void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - { -- int clear_ptk = 1; -+ int clear_keys = 1; - - if (sm == NULL) - return; -@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - /* Prepare for the next transition */ - wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); - -- clear_ptk = 0; -+ clear_keys = 0; - } - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ - -- if (clear_ptk) { -+ if (clear_keys) { - /* - * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if - * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. -@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); - sm->tptk_set = 0; - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } - - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS -@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) - os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); - os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); -@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { -- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; -- u16 keyidx; -- -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); -- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); -- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); -- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); -- -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); -- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); -- -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", -- igd.igtk, keylen); -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), -- broadcast_ether_addr, -- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), -- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { -- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " -- "WNM mode"); -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; -+ -+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) - return -1; -- } -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } else { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { - u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; - int rx_replay_counter_set; - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk; -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk; -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ - --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e2937b85..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,184 +0,0 @@ -From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep - Mode cases - -This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value -separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a -corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the -GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to -detect a possible key reconfiguration. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ - 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { - - static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, -- const u8 *key_rsc) -+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) - { - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; - u8 gtk_buf[32]; - - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { -+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || -+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", - gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); -@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - } - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); - -- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); -+ if (wnm_sleep) { -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); -+ } else { -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); -+ } - - return 0; - } -@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, - gtk_len, gtk_len, - &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || -- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { -+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); -@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, -- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, -+ int wnm_sleep) - { - size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); - u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); - - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ -- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && -- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { -+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || -+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", - keyidx); -@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - return -1; - } - -- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; -- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); -+ if (wnm_sleep) { -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); -+ } else { -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); -+ } - - return 0; - } -@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, - return -1; - - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) - return -1; - } - -@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm, - if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) - key_rsc = null_rsc; - -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || - wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) - goto failed; - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); -@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) - sm->tptk_set = 0; - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } - -@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); -@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) - - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", - gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " - "WNM mode"); -@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; - - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) - return -1; - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - } else { -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { - int rx_replay_counter_set; - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; - struct wpa_gtk gtk; -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W - struct wpa_igtk igtk; -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ - - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 22ee2179..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> -Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK - -Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver -and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from -trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. - -This fixes the earlier fix in commit -ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the -driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account -possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of -message 3/4. - -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> ---- - src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h -index d200285..1021ccb 100644 ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h -@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { - size_t kck_len; - size_t kek_len; - size_t tk_len; -+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ - }; - - struct wpa_gtk { -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm, - os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - } - sm->tptk_set = 1; -- sm->tk_to_set = 1; - - kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; - kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; -@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - enum wpa_alg alg; - const u8 *key_rsc; - -- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { -+ if (sm->ptk.installed) { - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, - "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); - return 0; -@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, - - /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ - os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); -- sm->tk_to_set = 0; -+ sm->ptk.installed = 1; - - if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { - eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { - struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; - int ptk_set, tptk_set; - unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; -- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; - u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; - u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ - int renew_snonce; --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c19c4c71..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce - -The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing -the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going -directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to -determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the -new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. - -Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state -for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) - } - - -+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) -+{ -+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); -+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; -+ return -1; -+ } -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, -+ WPA_NONCE_LEN); -+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) - { - u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; -@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); - else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); -- else if (sm->PTKRequest) -- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); -- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { -+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { -+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); -+ else -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); -+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { - case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: - break; - case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e1bd5a57..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration - -Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has -been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues -related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check -for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so -that behavior does not get modified. - -For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was -followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating -the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., -ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path -and simple replay attacks are not feasible. - -As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if -the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c -index e424168..9eb9738 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c -@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { - u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ - } tpk; - int tpk_set; -+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ - int tpk_success; - int tpk_in_progress; - -@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) - u8 rsc[6]; - enum wpa_alg alg; - -+ if (peer->tk_set) { -+ /* -+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver -+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an -+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing -+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must -+ * not allow that to happen. -+ */ -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR -+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); - - switch (peer->cipher) { -@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) - return -1; - } - -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); - if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, - rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { - wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " - "driver"); - return -1; - } -+ peer->tk_set = 1; - return 0; - } - -@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) - peer->cipher = 0; - peer->qos_info = 0; - peer->wmm_capable = 0; -- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; -+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; - peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; - os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); - os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); -@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: - wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); - return -1; - } -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ - wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", - peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); - os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); -@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, - } - - -+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) -+{ -+ int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { -+ if (nonce[i]) -+ return 1; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, - const u8 *buf, size_t len) - { -@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: - peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; - peer->cipher = cipher; - -- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { -+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || -+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { - /* - * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained - * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the -@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: - "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); - goto error; - } -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ - } - - #if 0 --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 85ea1d62..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending - request - -Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep -Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the -response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the -association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when -successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of -protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - - if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association"); -+ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested"); - return; - } - -@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - return; - } - -+ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0; -+ - if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT || - wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response " --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b9678f68..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames - -The driver is expected to not report a second association event without -the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this -case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same -pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, -be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this -even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected -Reassociation Response frame. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ - src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + - 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS - wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); - #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ - - /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ - wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c -index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c -@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len, - u16 capab; - - sm->ft_completed = 0; -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; - - buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + - 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; -@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, - return -1; - } - -+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); - return -1; -@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, - return -1; - } - -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; -+ - if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) - return -1; - -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h -@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { - size_t r0kh_id_len; - u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; - int ft_completed; -+ int ft_reassoc_completed; - int over_the_ds_in_progress; - u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ - int set_ptk_after_assoc; --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5ccb5098..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@ -WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key reinstallation - -Published: October 16, 2017 -Identifiers: -- CERT case ID: VU#228519 -- CVE-2017-13077 -- CVE-2017-13078 -- CVE-2017-13079 -- CVE-2017-13080 -- CVE-2017-13081 -- CVE-2017-13082 -- CVE-2017-13084 (not applicable) -- CVE-2017-13086 -- CVE-2017-13087 -- CVE-2017-13088 -Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/ - - -Vulnerability - -A vulnerability was found in how a number of implementations can be -triggered to reconfigure WPA/WPA2/RSN keys (TK, GTK, or IGTK) by -replaying a specific frame that is used to manage the keys. Such -reinstallation of the encryption key can result in two different types -of vulnerabilities: disabling replay protection and significantly -reducing the security of encryption to the point of allowing frames to -be decrypted or some parts of the keys to be determined by an attacker -depending on which cipher is used. - -This document focuses on the cases that apply to systems using hostapd -(AP) or wpa_supplicant (station), but it should be noted that the -generic vulnerability itself is applicable to other implementations and -may have different impact in other cases. - -This vulnerability can in theory apply to any case where a TK (the -pairwise/unicast encryption key used with TKIP, CCMP, GCMP), a GTK -(group/multicast encryption key), or an IGTK (group management frame -integrity protection key) is configured by the Authentication/Supplicant -component to the WLAN driver/firmware taking care of the TX/RX path and -encryption/decryption of frames. - -If the same key is configured multiple times, it is likely that the -transmit and receive packet numbers (PN, IPN, RSC/TSC, etc.) are cleared -to a smaller value (zero in case of pairwise keys, zero or at least a -smaller value than the last used value in case of group keys). When this -happens with the same key, this breaks replay protection on RX side and -can result in reuse of packet numbers on TX side. The former may allow -replaying of previously delivered packets (without the attacker being -able to decrypt them or modify their contents) while the latter may -result in more severe issues on the TX side due to resulting CCM nonce -replay and related issues with GCMP and TKIP. The TX side issue may make -it significantly easier for the attacker to decrypt frames and determine -some parts of the keys (e.g., a Michael MIC key in case of TKIP). - -Impact on AP/hostapd - -On the AP side, this generic issue has been determined to be applicable -in the case where hostapd is used to operate an RSN/WPA2 network with FT -(Fast BSS Transition from IEEE 802.11r) enabled. Replaying of the -Reassociation Request frame can be used to get the AP reinstalling the -TK which results in the AP accepting previously delivered unicast frames -from the station and the AP reusing previously used packet numbers -(local TX packet number gets reset to zero). This latter issue on the TX -side can result in CCM nonce reuse which invalidates CCMP security -properties. In case of TKIP this can result in the attacker being able -to determine part of the TK more easily and with GCMP, result in similar -issues. - -It should be noted that the AP side issue with FT would be close to -applying to FILS authentication (from IEEE 802.11ai) in hostapd with -replaying of (Re)Association Request frames. However, due to a different -handling of the repeated association processing with FILS, this would -actually result in the station getting immediately disconnected which -prevents this attack in practice. In addition, the FILS implementation -in the current hostapd version is still experimental and documented as -being discouraged in production use cases. - -Another area of potentially reduced security was identified when looking -into these issues. When AP/Authenticator implementation in hostapd is -requested to rekey the PTK without performing EAP reauthentication -(either through local periodic rekeying or due to a request from an -association station), the ANonce value does not get updated. This -results in the new 4-way handshake depending on the station/supplicant -side generating a new, unique (for the current PMK/PSK) SNonce for the -PTK derivation to result in a new key. While a properly working -supplicant would do so, if there is a supplicant implementation that -does not, this combination could result in deriving the same PTK -again. When the TK from that PTK gets configured in the driver, this -would result in reinstalling the same key and the same issues as -described above for the FT protocol case. - -Impact on station/wpa_supplicant - -On the station side, this generic issue has been determined to be -applicable in the cases where wpa_supplicant processes a group key (GTK -or IGTK) update from the AP. An attacker that is able to limit access -to frame delivery may be able to extract two update messages and deliver -those to the station with significant time delay between them. When -wpa_supplicant processes the second message, it may end up reinstalling -the same key to the driver and when doing this, clear the RX packet -number to an old value. This would allow the attacker to replay all -group-addressed frames that the AP sent between the time the key update -message was originally sent and the time when the attacker forwarded the -second frame to the station. The attacker would not be able to decrypt -or modify the frames based on this vulnerability, though. There is an -exception to this with older wpa_supplicant versions as noted below in -version specific notes. - -For the current wpa_supplicant version (v2.6), there is also an -additional EAPOL-Key replay sequence where an additional forged -EAPOL-Key message can be used to bypass the existing protection for the -pairwise key reconfiguration in a manner that ends up configuring a -known TK that an attacker could use to decrypt any frame sent by the -station and to inject arbitrary unicast frames. Similar issues are -reachable in older versions as noted below. - -PeerKey / TDLS PeerKey - -As far as the related CVE-2017-13084 (reinstallation of the STK key in -the PeerKey handshake) is concerned, it should be noted that PeerKey -implementation in wpa_supplicant is not fully functional and the actual -installation of the key into the driver does not work. As such, this -item is not applicable in practice. Furthermore, the PeerKey handshake -for IEEE 802.11e DLS is obsolete and not known to have been deployed. - -As far as the TDLS PeerKey handshake is concerned (CVE-2017-13086), -wpa_supplicant implementation is already rejecting TPK M2 retries, so -the reconfiguration issue cannot apply for it. For TPK M3, there is a -theoretical impact. However, if that frame is replayed, the current -wpa_supplicant implementation ends up tearing down the TDLS link -immediately and as such, there is no real window for performing the -attack. Furthermore, TPK M3 goes through the AP path and if RSN is used -there, that frame has replay protection, so the attacker could not -perform the attack. If the AP path were to use WEP, the frame could be -replayed, though. That said, if WEP is used on the AP path, it would be -fair to assume that there is no security in the network, so a new attack -vector would be of small additional value. - -With older wpa_supplicant versions, it may be possible for an attacker -to cause TPK M2 to be retransmitted with delay that would be able to -trigger reinstallation of TK on the peer receiving TPK M2 -(CVE-2017-13086). This may open a short window for the attack with v2.3, -v2.4, and v2.5; and a longer window with older versions. - -Vulnerable versions/configurations - -For the AP/Authenticator TK (unicast) reinstallation in FT protocol -(CVE-2017-13082): - -hostapd v0.7.2 and newer with FT enabled (i.e., practically all versions -that include full FT implementation). FT needs to be enabled in the -runtime configuration to make this applicable. - -For the AP/Authenticator missing ANonce during PTK rekeying: - -All hostapd versions. - -For the station/Supplicant side GTK/IGTK reinstallation and TK -configuration: - -All wpa_supplicant versions. The impact on older versions can be more -severe due to earlier changes in this area: v2.3 and older can also -reinstall the pairwise key and as such have similar impact as the AP FT -case (CVE-2017-13077); v2.4 and v2.5 end up configuring an all-zero TK -which breaks the normal data path, but could allow an attacker to -decrypt all following frames from the station and to inject arbitrary -frames to the station. In addition, a different message sequence -involving 4-way handshake can result in configuration of an all-zero TK -in v2.6 and the current snapshot of the development repository as of the -publication of this advisory. - - -Acknowledgments - -Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU -Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue. Thanks to John A. Van -Boxtel for finding additional issues related to this topic. - - -Possible mitigation steps - -- For AP/hostapd and FT replay issue (CVE-2017-13082), it is possible to - prevent the issue temporarily by disabling FT in runtime - configuration, if needed before being able to update the - implementations. - -- Merge the following commits to hostapd/wpa_supplicant and rebuild them: - - hostapd and replayed FT reassociation request frame (CVE-2017-13082): - hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake - - hostapd PTK rekeying and ANonce update: - Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce - - wpa_supplicant and GTK/IGTK rekeying (CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079, - CVE-2017-13080, CVE-2017-13081, CVE-2017-13087, CVE-2017-13088): - Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key - Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep Mode cases - - wpa_supplicant (v2.6 or newer snapshot) and known TK issue: - Prevent installation of an all-zero TK - - Additional protection steps for wpa_supplicant: - TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration - WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending request - FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames - - These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/ - (both against the snapshot of hostap.git master branch and rebased on - top of the v2.6 release) - - For the TDLS TPK M2 retransmission issue (CVE-2017-13086) with older - wpa_supplicant versions, consider updating to the latest version or - merge in a commit that is present in v2.6: - https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=dabdef9e048b17b22b1c025ad592922eab30dda8 - ('TDLS: Ignore incoming TDLS Setup Response retries') - -- Update to hostapd/wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available - * it should be noted that there are number of additional changes in - the related areas of the implementation to provide extra layer of - protection for potential unknown issues; these changes are not - included in this advisory as they have not been identified to be - critical for preventing any of the identified security - vulnerabilities; however, users of hostapd/wpa_supplicant are - encouraged to consider merging such changes even if not fully - moving to v2.7 diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config index 1c7f67df..966a98c2 100644 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/config/dot.config @@ -1,44 +1,599 @@ -CONFIG_AP=y -CONFIG_BACKEND=file -CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y -CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y -CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y -CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y -CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y +# Example wpa_supplicant build time configuration +# +# This file lists the configuration options that are used when building the +# wpa_supplicant binary. All lines starting with # are ignored. Configuration +# option lines must be commented out complete, if they are not to be included, +# i.e., just setting VARIABLE=n is not disabling that variable. +# +# This file is included in Makefile, so variables like CFLAGS and LIBS can also +# be modified from here. In most cases, these lines should use += in order not +# to override previous values of the variables. + + +# Uncomment following two lines and fix the paths if you have installed OpenSSL +# or GnuTLS in non-default location +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/openssl/include +#LIBS += -L/usr/local/openssl/lib + +# Some Red Hat versions seem to include kerberos header files from OpenSSL, but +# the kerberos files are not in the default include path. Following line can be +# used to fix build issues on such systems (krb5.h not found). +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/kerberos + +# Driver interface for generic Linux wireless extensions +# Note: WEXT is deprecated in the current Linux kernel version and no new +# functionality is added to it. nl80211-based interface is the new +# replacement for WEXT and its use allows wpa_supplicant to properly control +# the driver to improve existing functionality like roaming and to support new +# functionality. CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y + +# Driver interface for Linux drivers using the nl80211 kernel interface +CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y + +# QCA vendor extensions to nl80211 +CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211_QCA=y + +# driver_nl80211.c requires libnl. If you are compiling it yourself +# you may need to point hostapd to your version of libnl. +# +#CFLAGS += -I$<path to libnl include files> +#LIBS += -L$<path to libnl library files> + +# Use libnl v2.0 (or 3.0) libraries. +#CONFIG_LIBNL20=y + +# Use libnl 3.2 libraries (if this is selected, CONFIG_LIBNL20 is ignored) +CONFIG_LIBNL32=y + + +# Driver interface for FreeBSD net80211 layer (e.g., Atheros driver) +#CONFIG_DRIVER_BSD=y +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include +#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib +#LIBS_p += -L/usr/local/lib +#LIBS_c += -L/usr/local/lib + +# Driver interface for Windows NDIS +#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDIS=y +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/w32api/ddk +#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib +# For native build using mingw +#CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS=y +# Additional directories for cross-compilation on Linux host for mingw target +#CFLAGS += -I/opt/mingw/mingw32/include/ddk +#LIBS += -L/opt/mingw/mingw32/lib +#CC=mingw32-gcc +# By default, driver_ndis uses WinPcap for low-level operations. This can be +# replaced with the following option which replaces WinPcap calls with NDISUIO. +# However, this requires that WZC is disabled (net stop wzcsvc) before starting +# wpa_supplicant. +# CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y + +# Driver interface for wired Ethernet drivers CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y -CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y -CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y -CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y -CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y -CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y -CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y -CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y + +# Driver interface for MACsec capable Qualcomm Atheros drivers +#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_QCA=y + +# Driver interface for Linux MACsec drivers +CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_LINUX=y + +# Driver interface for the Broadcom RoboSwitch family +#CONFIG_DRIVER_ROBOSWITCH=y + +# Driver interface for no driver (e.g., WPS ER only) +#CONFIG_DRIVER_NONE=y + +# Solaris libraries +#LIBS += -lsocket -ldlpi -lnsl +#LIBS_c += -lsocket + +# Enable IEEE 802.1X Supplicant (automatically included if any EAP method or +# MACsec is included) +CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y + +# EAP-MD5 CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y + +# EAP-MSCHAPv2 CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y + +# EAP-TLS +CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y + +# EAL-PEAP +CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y + +# EAP-TTLS +CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y + +# EAP-FAST +# Note: If OpenSSL is used as the TLS library, OpenSSL 1.0 or newer is needed +# for EAP-FAST support. Older OpenSSL releases would need to be patched, e.g., +# with openssl-0.9.8x-tls-extensions.patch, to add the needed functions. +CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y + +# EAP-GTC +CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y + +# EAP-OTP CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y + +# EAP-SIM (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-SIM is used) +#CONFIG_EAP_SIM=y + +# EAP-PSK (experimental; this is _not_ needed for WPA-PSK) +#CONFIG_EAP_PSK=y + +# EAP-pwd (secure authentication using only a password) +#CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y + +# EAP-PAX CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y -CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y + +# LEAP +CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y + +# EAP-AKA (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA is used) +CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y + +# EAP-AKA' (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA' is used). +# This requires CONFIG_EAP_AKA to be enabled, too. +#CONFIG_EAP_AKA_PRIME=y + +# Enable USIM simulator (Milenage) for EAP-AKA +#CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR=y + +# EAP-SAKE CONFIG_EAP_SAKE=y -CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y + +# EAP-GPSK +CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y +# Include support for optional SHA256 cipher suite in EAP-GPSK +CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y + +# EAP-TNC and related Trusted Network Connect support (experimental) CONFIG_EAP_TNC=y -CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y -CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y -CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y -CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y -CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y -CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y -CONFIG_LIBNL32=y -CONFIG_P2P=y + +# Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) +CONFIG_WPS=y +# Enable WPS external registrar functionality +#CONFIG_WPS_ER=y +# Disable credentials for an open network by default when acting as a WPS +# registrar. +#CONFIG_WPS_REG_DISABLE_OPEN=y +# Enable WPS support with NFC config method +#CONFIG_WPS_NFC=y + +# EAP-IKEv2 +CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y + +# EAP-EKE +#CONFIG_EAP_EKE=y + +# MACsec +CONFIG_MACSEC=y + +# Peerkey support: CONFIG_PEERKEY=y + +# PKCS#12 (PFX) support (used to read private key and certificate file from +# a file that usually has extension .p12 or .pfx) CONFIG_PKCS12=y -CONFIG_READLINE=y + +# Smartcard support (i.e., private key on a smartcard), e.g., with openssl +# engine. CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y -CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="PROFILE=SYSTEM:3DES" + +# PC/SC interface for smartcards (USIM, GSM SIM) +# Enable this if EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA is included +#CONFIG_PCSC=y + +# Support HT overrides (disable HT/HT40, mask MCS rates, etc.) +#CONFIG_HT_OVERRIDES=y + +# Support VHT overrides (disable VHT, mask MCS rates, etc.) +#CONFIG_VHT_OVERRIDES=y + +# Development testing +#CONFIG_EAPOL_TEST=y + +# Select control interface backend for external programs, e.g, wpa_cli: +# unix = UNIX domain sockets (default for Linux/*BSD) +# udp = UDP sockets using localhost (127.0.0.1) +# udp6 = UDP IPv6 sockets using localhost (::1) +# named_pipe = Windows Named Pipe (default for Windows) +# udp-remote = UDP sockets with remote access (only for tests systems/purpose) +# udp6-remote = UDP IPv6 sockets with remote access (only for tests purpose) +# y = use default (backwards compatibility) +# If this option is commented out, control interface is not included in the +# build. +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y + +# Include support for GNU Readline and History Libraries in wpa_cli. +# When building a wpa_cli binary for distribution, please note that these +# libraries are licensed under GPL and as such, BSD license may not apply for +# the resulting binary. +CONFIG_READLINE=y + +# Include internal line edit mode in wpa_cli. This can be used as a replacement +# for GNU Readline to provide limited command line editing and history support. +#CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y + +# Remove debugging code that is printing out debug message to stdout. +# This can be used to reduce the size of the wpa_supplicant considerably +# if debugging code is not needed. The size reduction can be around 35% +# (e.g., 90 kB). +#CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG=y + +# Remove WPA support, e.g., for wired-only IEEE 802.1X supplicant, to save +# 35-50 kB in code size. +#CONFIG_NO_WPA=y + +# Remove IEEE 802.11i/WPA-Personal ASCII passphrase support +# This option can be used to reduce code size by removing support for +# converting ASCII passphrases into PSK. If this functionality is removed, the +# PSK can only be configured as the 64-octet hexstring (e.g., from +# wpa_passphrase). This saves about 0.5 kB in code size. +#CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE=y + +# Disable scan result processing (ap_mode=1) to save code size by about 1 kB. +# This can be used if ap_scan=1 mode is never enabled. +#CONFIG_NO_SCAN_PROCESSING=y + +# Select configuration backend: +# file = text file (e.g., wpa_supplicant.conf; note: the configuration file +# path is given on command line, not here; this option is just used to +# select the backend that allows configuration files to be used) +# winreg = Windows registry (see win_example.reg for an example) +CONFIG_BACKEND=file + +# Remove configuration write functionality (i.e., to allow the configuration +# file to be updated based on runtime configuration changes). The runtime +# configuration can still be changed, the changes are just not going to be +# persistent over restarts. This option can be used to reduce code size by +# about 3.5 kB. +#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE=y + +# Remove support for configuration blobs to reduce code size by about 1.5 kB. +#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS=y + +# Select program entry point implementation: +# main = UNIX/POSIX like main() function (default) +# main_winsvc = Windows service (read parameters from registry) +# main_none = Very basic example (development use only) +#CONFIG_MAIN=main + +# Select wrapper for operating system and C library specific functions +# unix = UNIX/POSIX like systems (default) +# win32 = Windows systems +# none = Empty template +#CONFIG_OS=unix + +# Select event loop implementation +# eloop = select() loop (default) +# eloop_win = Windows events and WaitForMultipleObject() loop +#CONFIG_ELOOP=eloop + +# Should we use poll instead of select? Select is used by default. +#CONFIG_ELOOP_POLL=y + +# Should we use epoll instead of select? Select is used by default. +#CONFIG_ELOOP_EPOLL=y + +# Should we use kqueue instead of select? Select is used by default. +#CONFIG_ELOOP_KQUEUE=y + +# Select layer 2 packet implementation +# linux = Linux packet socket (default) +# pcap = libpcap/libdnet/WinPcap +# freebsd = FreeBSD libpcap +# winpcap = WinPcap with receive thread +# ndis = Windows NDISUIO (note: requires CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y) +# none = Empty template +#CONFIG_L2_PACKET=linux + +# Disable Linux packet socket workaround applicable for station interface +# in a bridge for EAPOL frames. This should be uncommented only if the kernel +# is known to not have the regression issue in packet socket behavior with +# bridge interfaces (commit 'bridge: respect RFC2863 operational state')'). +#CONFIG_NO_LINUX_PACKET_SOCKET_WAR=y + +# IEEE 802.11w (management frame protection), also known as PMF +# Driver support is also needed for IEEE 802.11w. +CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y + +# Select TLS implementation +# openssl = OpenSSL (default) +# gnutls = GnuTLS +# internal = Internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental) +# linux = Linux kernel AF_ALG and internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental) +# none = Empty template +CONFIG_TLS=openssl + +# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.1) +# can be enabled to get a stronger construction of messages when block ciphers +# are used. It should be noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based +# implementation may not be compatible with TLS v1.1 message (ClientHello is +# sent prior to negotiating which version will be used) +CONFIG_TLSV11=y + +# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.2) +# can be enabled to enable use of stronger crypto algorithms. It should be +# noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based implementation may not be compatible +# with TLS v1.2 message (ClientHello is sent prior to negotiating which version +# will be used) +#CONFIG_TLSV12=y + +# Select which ciphers to use by default with OpenSSL if the user does not +# specify them. +#CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="PROFILE=SYSTEM:3DES" +CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" + +# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are +# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of +# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits +# and drawbacks of this option. +#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH=y +#ifndef CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH +#LTM_PATH=/usr/src/libtommath-0.39 +#CFLAGS += -I$(LTM_PATH) +#LIBS += -L$(LTM_PATH) +#LIBS_p += -L$(LTM_PATH) +#endif +# At the cost of about 4 kB of additional binary size, the internal LibTomMath +# can be configured to include faster routines for exptmod, sqr, and div to +# speed up DH and RSA calculation considerably +#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH_FAST=y + +# Include NDIS event processing through WMI into wpa_supplicant/wpasvc. +# This is only for Windows builds and requires WMI-related header files and +# WbemUuid.Lib from Platform SDK even when building with MinGW. +#CONFIG_NDIS_EVENTS_INTEGRATED=y +#PLATFORMSDKLIB="/opt/Program Files/Microsoft Platform SDK/Lib" + +# Add support for old DBus control interface +# (fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant) +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y + +# Add support for new DBus control interface +# (fi.w1.hostap.wpa_supplicant1) +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y + +# Add introspection support for new DBus control interface +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y + +# Add support for loading EAP methods dynamically as shared libraries. +# When this option is enabled, each EAP method can be either included +# statically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=y) or dynamically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=dyn). +# Dynamic EAP methods are build as shared objects (eap_*.so) and they need to +# be loaded in the beginning of the wpa_supplicant configuration file +# (see load_dynamic_eap parameter in the example file) before being used in +# the network blocks. +# +# Note that some shared parts of EAP methods are included in the main program +# and in order to be able to use dynamic EAP methods using these parts, the +# main program must have been build with the EAP method enabled (=y or =dyn). +# This means that EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST cannot be added as dynamic libraries +# unless at least one of them was included in the main build to force inclusion +# of the shared code. Similarly, at least one of EAP-SIM/AKA must be included +# in the main build to be able to load these methods dynamically. +# +# Please also note that using dynamic libraries will increase the total binary +# size. Thus, it may not be the best option for targets that have limited +# amount of memory/flash. +#CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y + +# IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition) for station mode +CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y + +# Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt) +CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y + +# Send debug messages to syslog instead of stdout +CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y +# Set syslog facility for debug messages +#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG_FACILITY=LOG_DAEMON + +# Add support for sending all debug messages (regardless of debug verbosity) +# to the Linux kernel tracing facility. This helps debug the entire stack by +# making it easy to record everything happening from the driver up into the +# same file, e.g., using trace-cmd. +#CONFIG_DEBUG_LINUX_TRACING=y + +# Add support for writing debug log to Android logcat instead of standard +# output +#CONFIG_ANDROID_LOG=y + +# Enable privilege separation (see README 'Privilege separation' for details) +#CONFIG_PRIVSEP=y + +# Enable mitigation against certain attacks against TKIP by delaying Michael +# MIC error reports by a random amount of time between 0 and 60 seconds +#CONFIG_DELAYED_MIC_ERROR_REPORT=y + +# Enable tracing code for developer debugging +# This tracks use of memory allocations and other registrations and reports +# incorrect use with a backtrace of call (or allocation) location. +#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y +# For BSD, uncomment these. +#LIBS += -lexecinfo +#LIBS_p += -lexecinfo +#LIBS_c += -lexecinfo + +# Use libbfd to get more details for developer debugging +# This enables use of libbfd to get more detailed symbols for the backtraces +# generated by CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y. +#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE_BFD=y +# For BSD, uncomment these. +#LIBS += -lbfd -liberty -lz +#LIBS_p += -lbfd -liberty -lz +#LIBS_c += -lbfd -liberty -lz + +# wpa_supplicant depends on strong random number generation being available +# from the operating system. os_get_random() function is used to fetch random +# data when needed, e.g., for key generation. On Linux and BSD systems, this +# works by reading /dev/urandom. It should be noted that the OS entropy pool +# needs to be properly initialized before wpa_supplicant is started. This is +# important especially on embedded devices that do not have a hardware random +# number generator and may by default start up with minimal entropy available +# for random number generation. +# +# As a safety net, wpa_supplicant is by default trying to internally collect +# additional entropy for generating random data to mix in with the data fetched +# from the OS. This by itself is not considered to be very strong, but it may +# help in cases where the system pool is not initialized properly. However, it +# is very strongly recommended that the system pool is initialized with enough +# entropy either by using hardware assisted random number generator or by +# storing state over device reboots. +# +# wpa_supplicant can be configured to maintain its own entropy store over +# restarts to enhance random number generation. This is not perfect, but it is +# much more secure than using the same sequence of random numbers after every +# reboot. This can be enabled with -e<entropy file> command line option. The +# specified file needs to be readable and writable by wpa_supplicant. +# +# If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong random data (e.g., on +# Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of random +# data from /dev/urandom), the internal wpa_supplicant random pool can be +# disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this +# should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on devices +# that meet the requirements described above. +#CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y + +# IEEE 802.11n (High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) +CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y + +# IEEE 802.11ac (Very High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) +# (depends on CONFIG_IEEE80211N) +CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y + +# Wireless Network Management (IEEE Std 802.11v-2011) +# Note: This is experimental and not complete implementation. +#CONFIG_WNM=y + +# Interworking (IEEE 802.11u) +# This can be used to enable functionality to improve interworking with +# external networks (GAS/ANQP to learn more about the networks and network +# selection based on available credentials). +#CONFIG_INTERWORKING=y + +# Hotspot 2.0 +#CONFIG_HS20=y + +# Enable interface matching in wpa_supplicant +#CONFIG_MATCH_IFACE=y + +# Disable roaming in wpa_supplicant +#CONFIG_NO_ROAMING=y + +# AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant +# This can be used for controlling AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant. It +# should be noted that this is mainly aimed at simple cases like +# WPA2-Personal while more complex configurations like WPA2-Enterprise with an +# external RADIUS server can be supported with hostapd. +CONFIG_AP=y + +# P2P (Wi-Fi Direct) +# This can be used to enable P2P support in wpa_supplicant. See README-P2P for +# more information on P2P operations. +CONFIG_P2P=y + +# Enable TDLS support +#CONFIG_TDLS=y + +# Wi-Fi Direct +# This can be used to enable Wi-Fi Direct extensions for P2P using an external +# program to control the additional information exchanges in the messages. CONFIG_WIFI_DISPLAY=y -CONFIG_WPS=y -#CONFIG_MACSEC=y -#CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_LINUX=y + +# Autoscan +# This can be used to enable automatic scan support in wpa_supplicant. +# See wpa_supplicant.conf for more information on autoscan usage. +# +# Enabling directly a module will enable autoscan support. +# For exponential module: +#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_EXPONENTIAL=y +# For periodic module: +#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_PERIODIC=y + +# Password (and passphrase, etc.) backend for external storage +# These optional mechanisms can be used to add support for storing passwords +# and other secrets in external (to wpa_supplicant) location. This allows, for +# example, operating system specific key storage to be used +# +# External password backend for testing purposes (developer use) +#CONFIG_EXT_PASSWORD_TEST=y + +# Enable Fast Session Transfer (FST) +#CONFIG_FST=y + +# Enable CLI commands for FST testing +#CONFIG_FST_TEST=y + +# OS X builds. This is only for building eapol_test. +#CONFIG_OSX=y + +# Automatic Channel Selection +# This will allow wpa_supplicant to pick the channel automatically when channel +# is set to "0". +# +# TODO: Extend parser to be able to parse "channel=acs_survey" as an alternative +# to "channel=0". This would enable us to eventually add other ACS algorithms in +# similar way. +# +# Automatic selection is currently only done through initialization, later on +# we hope to do background checks to keep us moving to more ideal channels as +# time goes by. ACS is currently only supported through the nl80211 driver and +# your driver must have survey dump capability that is filled by the driver +# during scanning. +# +# TODO: In analogy to hostapd be able to customize the ACS survey algorithm with +# a newly to create wpa_supplicant.conf variable acs_num_scans. +# +# Supported ACS drivers: +# * ath9k +# * ath5k +# * ath10k +# +# For more details refer to: +# http://wireless.kernel.org/en/users/Documentation/acs +#CONFIG_ACS=y + +# Support Multi Band Operation +#CONFIG_MBO=y + +# Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS) (IEEE 802.11ai) +# Note: This is an experimental and not yet complete implementation. This +# should not be enabled for production use. +#CONFIG_FILS=y +# FILS shared key authentication with PFS +#CONFIG_FILS_SK_PFS=y + +# Support RSN on IBSS networks +# This is needed to be able to use mode=1 network profile with proto=RSN and +# key_mgmt=WPA-PSK (i.e., full key management instead of WPA-None). +CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y + +# External PMKSA cache control +# This can be used to enable control interface commands that allow the current +# PMKSA cache entries to be fetched and new entries to be added. +#CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y + +# Mesh Networking (IEEE 802.11s) +#CONFIG_MESH=y + +# Background scanning modules +# These can be used to request wpa_supplicant to perform background scanning +# operations for roaming within an ESS (same SSID). See the bgscan parameter in +# the wpa_supplicant.conf file for more details. +# Periodic background scans based on signal strength +CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y +# Learn channels used by the network and try to avoid bgscans on other +# channels (experimental) +#CONFIG_BGSCAN_LEARN=y + +# Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) +# Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt +#CONFIG_OWE=y diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bee574a5..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,127 +0,0 @@ -From 25b37c54a47e49d591f5752bbf0f510480402cae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> -Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2017 11:14:10 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OpenSSL: Fix private key password handling with OpenSSL - >= 1.1.0f - -Since OpenSSL version 1.1.0f, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the -callback from the SSL object instead of the one from the CTX, so let's -set the callback on both SSL and CTX. Note that -SSL_set_default_passwd_cb*() is available only in 1.1.0. - -Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> -(cherry picked from commit f665c93e1d28fbab3d9127a8c3985cc32940824f) ---- - src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -index c4170b6..bceb8c3 100644 ---- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -@@ -2779,6 +2779,15 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, - } else - passwd = NULL; - -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) -+ /* -+ * In OpenSSL >= 1.1.0f SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the callback -+ * from the SSL object. See OpenSSL commit d61461a75253. -+ */ -+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, tls_passwd_cb); -+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(conn->ssl, passwd); -+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ -+ /* Keep these for OpenSSL < 1.1.0f */ - SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, tls_passwd_cb); - SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, passwd); - -@@ -2869,6 +2878,9 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, - return -1; - } - ERR_clear_error(); -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) -+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL); -+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ - SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); - os_free(passwd); - --- -2.9.3 - -From b2887d6964a406eb5f88f4ad4e9764c468954382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 12:06:17 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 2/2] OpenSSL: Clear default_passwd_cb more thoroughly - -Previously, the pointer to strdup passwd was left in OpenSSL library -default_passwd_cb_userdata and even the default_passwd_cb was left set -on an error path. To avoid unexpected behavior if something were to -manage to use there pointers, clear them explicitly once done with -loading of the private key. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -(cherry picked from commit 89971d8b1e328a2f79699c953625d1671fd40384) ---- - src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- - 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -index bceb8c3..770af9e 100644 ---- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c -@@ -2758,6 +2758,19 @@ static int tls_connection_engine_private_key(struct tls_connection *conn) - } - - -+static void tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSL *ssl) -+{ -+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) -+ if (ssl) { -+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl, NULL); -+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl, NULL); -+ } -+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ -+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); -+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, NULL); -+} -+ -+ - static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, - struct tls_connection *conn, - const char *private_key, -@@ -2874,14 +2887,12 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data, - if (!ok) { - tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, - "Failed to load private key"); -+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl); - os_free(passwd); - return -1; - } - ERR_clear_error(); --#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) -- SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL); --#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */ -- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); -+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl); - os_free(passwd); - - if (!SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl)) { -@@ -2924,13 +2935,14 @@ static int tls_global_private_key(struct tls_data *data, - tls_read_pkcs12(data, NULL, private_key, passwd)) { - tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, - "Failed to load private key"); -+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); - os_free(passwd); - ERR_clear_error(); - return -1; - } -+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); - os_free(passwd); - ERR_clear_error(); -- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL); - - if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) { - tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, --- -2.9.3 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/allow-tlsv1.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/allow-tlsv1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..eb5fb781 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/allow-tlsv1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +From: Andrej Shadura <andrewsh@debian.org> +Subject: Enable TLSv1.0 by default + +OpenSSL 1.1.1 disables TLSv1.0 by default and sets the security level to 2. +Some older networks may support for TLSv1.0 and less secure cyphers. + +--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c +@@ -988,6 +988,13 @@ + os_free(data); + return NULL; + } ++ ++#ifndef EAP_SERVER_TLS ++ /* Enable TLSv1.0 by default to allow connecting to legacy ++ * networks since Debian OpenSSL is set to minimum TLSv1.2 and SECLEVEL=2. */ ++ SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ssl, TLS1_VERSION); ++#endif ++ + data->ssl = ssl; + if (conf) + data->tls_session_lifetime = conf->tls_session_lifetime; diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 7e2449f2..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in ---- wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in 2012-04-16 15:15:40.000000000 -0500 -+++ wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in 2012-05-06 01:07:44.523999837 -0500 -@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - [D-BUS Service] - Name=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant --Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u -+Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -B -u -f /var/log/wpa_supplicant.log -P /var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid - User=root - SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service -diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in ---- wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3.orig/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in 2012-04-16 15:15:40.000000000 -0500 -+++ wpa_supplicant-1.0-rc3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in 2012-05-06 01:06:59.528589953 -0500 -@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ - [D-BUS Service] - Name=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1 --Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u -+Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -B -u -f /var/log/wpa_supplicant.log -P /var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid - User=root - SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff deleted file mode 100644 index 7f85e810..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ ---- ./wpa_supplicant/events.c.orig 2017-01-05 11:29:16.968898845 -0600 -+++ ./wpa_supplicant/events.c 2017-01-05 11:31:13.515907254 -0600 -@@ -1555,11 +1555,11 @@ - if (wpa_s->last_scan_req == MANUAL_SCAN_REQ && - wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id && wpa_s->own_scan_running && - own_request && !(data && data->scan_info.external_scan)) { -- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u", -+ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u", - wpa_s->manual_scan_id); - wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id = 0; - } else { -- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS); -+ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS); - } - wpas_notify_scan_results(wpa_s); - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0c03e1dc..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -From 290834df69556b903b49f2a45671cc62b44f13bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 17:59:30 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] nl80211: Fix race condition in detecting MAC change - -Commit 3e0272ca00ce1df35b45e7d739dd7e935f13fd84 ('nl80211: Re-read MAC -address on RTM_NEWLINK') added the detection of external changes to MAC -address when the interface is brought up. - -If the interface state is changed quickly enough, wpa_supplicant may -receive the netlink message for the !IFF_UP event when the interface -has already been brought up and would ignore the next netlink IFF_UP -message, missing the MAC change. - -Fix this by also reloading the MAC address when a !IFF_UP event is -received with the interface up, because this implies that the -interface went down and up again, possibly changing the address. - -Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com> ---- - src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- - 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c -index af1cb84..24fad29 100644 ---- a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c -+++ b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c -@@ -933,6 +933,30 @@ nl80211_find_drv(struct nl80211_global *global, int idx, u8 *buf, size_t len) - } - - -+static void nl80211_refresh_mac(struct wpa_driver_nl80211_data *drv, -+ int ifindex) -+{ -+ struct i802_bss *bss; -+ u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; -+ -+ bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifindex); -+ if (bss && -+ linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock, -+ bss->ifname, addr) < 0) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address", -+ bss->ifname); -+ } else if (bss && os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -+ "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from " -+ MACSTR " to " MACSTR, -+ ifindex, bss->ifname, -+ MAC2STR(bss->addr), MAC2STR(addr)); -+ os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); -+ } -+} -+ -+ - static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx, - struct ifinfomsg *ifi, - u8 *buf, size_t len) -@@ -997,6 +1021,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx, - namebuf[0] = '\0'; - if (if_indextoname(ifi->ifi_index, namebuf) && - linux_iface_up(drv->global->ioctl_sock, namebuf) > 0) { -+ /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */ -+ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Ignore interface down " - "event since interface %s is up", namebuf); - drv->ignore_if_down_event = 0; -@@ -1044,27 +1070,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx, - "event since interface %s is marked " - "removed", drv->first_bss->ifname); - } else { -- struct i802_bss *bss; -- u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; -- - /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */ -- bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifi->ifi_index); -- if (bss && -- linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock, -- bss->ifname, addr) < 0) { -- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -- "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address", -- bss->ifname); -- } else if (bss && -- os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) { -- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, -- "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from " -- MACSTR " to " MACSTR, -- ifi->ifi_index, bss->ifname, -- MAC2STR(bss->addr), -- MAC2STR(addr)); -- os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); -- } -+ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index); - - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Interface up"); - drv->if_disabled = 0; --- -2.9.3 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d99be04c..00000000 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -From 0ad5893a2f1f521d44712cd395e067ccf0a397c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de> -Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 01:14:28 +0200 -Subject: PAE: Validate input before pointer - -ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() calls ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist() -before body_len has been checked on all segments. - -ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() and ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist() might -continue and thus underflow left_len even if it finds left_len to small -(or before checking). - -Additionally, ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body() might perform out of bound -reads in this case. - -Fix this by checking left_len and aborting if too small early. - -Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de> ---- - src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c -index c4bfcbc..cad0292 100644 ---- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c -+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c -@@ -964,21 +964,19 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant, - body_len = get_mka_param_body_len(hdr); - body_type = get_mka_param_body_type(hdr); - -- if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST && -- body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST) -- continue; -- -- ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body( -- (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos); -- -- if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + body_len + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) { -+ if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len) + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, - "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV", - left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN, -- body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN); -- continue; -+ MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len), -+ DEFAULT_ICV_LEN); -+ return FALSE; - } - -+ if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST && -+ body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST) -+ continue; -+ - if ((body_len % 16) != 0) { - wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, - "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) should be a multiple of 16 octets", -@@ -986,6 +984,9 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant, - continue; - } - -+ ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body( -+ (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos); -+ - for (i = 0; i < body_len; - i += sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id)) { - const struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id *peer_mi; -@@ -3018,7 +3019,7 @@ static int ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, - "KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV", - left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN, - body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN); -- continue; -+ return -1; - } - - if (handled[body_type]) --- -cgit v0.12 - diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-2.7-fix-undefined-remove-ie.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-2.7-fix-undefined-remove-ie.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97a8cc7f --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-2.7-fix-undefined-remove-ie.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From f2973fa39d6109f0f34969e91551a98dc340d537 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 12:00:26 +0200 +Subject: FT: Fix CONFIG_IEEE80211X=y build without CONFIG_FILS=y + +remove_ie() was defined within an ifdef CONFIG_FILS block while it is +now needed even without CONFIG_FILS=y. Remove the CONFIG_FILS condition +there. + +Fixes 8c41734e5de1 ("FT: Fix Reassociation Request IEs during FT protocol") +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + wpa_supplicant/sme.c | 2 -- + 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/sme.c b/wpa_supplicant/sme.c +index 39c8069..f77f751 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/sme.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/sme.c +@@ -1386,7 +1386,6 @@ void sme_event_auth(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, union wpa_event_data *data) + } + + +-#ifdef CONFIG_FILS + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + static void remove_ie(u8 *buf, size_t *len, u8 eid) + { +@@ -1401,7 +1400,6 @@ static void remove_ie(u8 *buf, size_t *len, u8 eid) + } + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ +-#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ + + + void sme_associate(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, enum wpas_mode mode, +-- +cgit v0.12 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/assoc-timeout.diff b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch index 8be4d2cd..c3b3568c 100644 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/assoc-timeout.diff +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c ---- wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2013-01-12 09:42:53.000000000 -0600 -+++ wpa_supplicant-2.0/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2013-05-11 14:09:34.586718122 -0500 -@@ -1666,10 +1666,10 @@ +diff -up wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c.assoc-timeout wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c +--- wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c.assoc-timeout 2010-09-07 10:43:39.000000000 -0500 ++++ wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c 2010-12-07 18:57:45.163457000 -0600 +@@ -1262,10 +1262,10 @@ void wpa_supplicant_associate(struct wpa if (assoc_failed) { /* give IBSS a bit more time */ diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-dbus-service-file-args.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-dbus-service-file-args.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b7478dad --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-dbus-service-file-args.patch @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +diff -up wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in.fedora wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in +--- wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in.fedora 2008-03-02 20:58:35.000000000 -0500 ++++ wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in 2008-03-02 20:58:41.000000000 -0500 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + [D-BUS Service] + Name=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1 +-Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u ++Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -B -u -f /var/log/wpa_supplicant.log -c /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -P /var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid + User=root + SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service +diff -up wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in.fedora wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in +--- wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in.fedora 2008-03-02 20:58:35.000000000 -0500 ++++ wpa_supplicant-0.7.3/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in 2008-03-02 20:58:41.000000000 -0500 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + [D-BUS Service] + Name=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant +-Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u ++Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -B -u -f /var/log/wpa_supplicant.log -c /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -P /var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid + User=root + SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/flush-debug-output.diff b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch index 7d6af7b3..a6868518 100644 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/flush-debug-output.diff +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/utils/wpa_debug.c ---- wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c 2013-01-12 09:42:53.000000000 -0600 -+++ wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/utils/wpa_debug.c 2013-05-11 14:10:37.886101742 -0500 -@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ +--- wpa_supplicant-0.6.3/src/utils/wpa_debug.c.flush-debug 2007-07-30 23:15:34.000000000 -0400 ++++ wpa_supplicant-0.6.3/src/utils/wpa_debug.c 2007-07-30 23:17:06.000000000 -0400 +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ void wpa_debug_print_timestamp(void) if (out_file) { fprintf(out_file, "%ld.%06u: ", (long) tv.sec, (unsigned int) tv.usec); @@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/u } else #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ printf("%ld.%06u: ", (long) tv.sec, (unsigned int) tv.usec); -@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ +@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ void wpa_printf(int level, char *fmt, .. if (out_file) { vfprintf(out_file, fmt, ap); fprintf(out_file, "\n"); @@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/u } else { #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ vprintf(fmt, ap); -@@ -357,6 +359,7 @@ +@@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ static void _wpa_hexdump(int level, cons fprintf(out_file, " [REMOVED]"); } fprintf(out_file, "\n"); @@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/u } else { #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE */ printf("%s - hexdump(len=%lu):", title, (unsigned long) len); -@@ -425,12 +428,14 @@ +@@ -262,12 +265,14 @@ static void _wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level fprintf(out_file, "%s - hexdump_ascii(len=%lu): [REMOVED]\n", title, (unsigned long) len); @@ -40,7 +39,7 @@ diff -Nur wpa_supplicant-2.0.orig/src/utils/wpa_debug.c wpa_supplicant-2.0/src/u return; } fprintf(out_file, "%s - hexdump_ascii(len=%lu):\n", -@@ -455,6 +460,7 @@ +@@ -292,6 +297,7 @@ static void _wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level pos += llen; len -= llen; } diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c54cd9a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 9404f356e394604d1d3d6dbffc52abd54260e4d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> +Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 08:56:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] wpa_supplicant: allow overriding the names of the Qt4 tools + +This is useful for distributions that ship different versions of Qt in +different locations. +--- + wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 7 +++++-- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile +index ad9ead9..b19676d 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile +@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ export INCDIR ?= /usr/local/include/ + export BINDIR ?= /usr/local/sbin/ + PKG_CONFIG ?= pkg-config + ++QMAKE ?= qmake ++LRELEASE ?= lrelease ++ + CFLAGS += $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) + CFLAGS += -I$(abspath ../src) + CFLAGS += -I$(abspath ../src/utils) +@@ -1787,10 +1790,10 @@ wpa_gui: + @echo "wpa_gui has been removed - see wpa_gui-qt4 for replacement" + + wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile: +- qmake -o wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro ++ $(QMAKE) -o wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro + + wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.qm: wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.ts +- lrelease wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro ++ $(LRELEASE) wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui.pro + + wpa_gui-qt4: wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.qm + $(MAKE) -C wpa_gui-qt4 +-- +2.6.2 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c646a304 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/patches/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 763a4ef660e2bd81f6cdc71a2f29a0a3e71b2ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 15:48:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] quiet an annoying and frequent syslog message + +--- + wpa_supplicant/events.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/events.c b/wpa_supplicant/events.c +index abe3b47..72a0412 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/events.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/events.c +@@ -1555,11 +1555,11 @@ static int _wpa_supplicant_event_scan_results(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + if (wpa_s->last_scan_req == MANUAL_SCAN_REQ && + wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id && wpa_s->own_scan_running && + own_request && !(data && data->scan_info.external_scan)) { +- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u", ++ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS "id=%u", + wpa_s->manual_scan_id); + wpa_s->manual_scan_use_id = 0; + } else { +- wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS); ++ wpa_msg_ctrl(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, WPA_EVENT_SCAN_RESULTS); + } + wpas_notify_scan_results(wpa_s); + +-- +2.9.3 + diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc index b891fbbd..a6b63978 100644 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/slack-desc @@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ wpa_supplicant: component that is used in the client stations. It implements key wpa_supplicant: negotiation with a WPA Authenticator and it controls the roaming and wpa_supplicant: IEEE 802.11 authentication/association of the wlan driver. wpa_supplicant: -wpa_supplicant: More info: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/ +wpa_supplicant: Homepage: http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/ wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant: diff --git a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild index d4e56cbb..492ddb72 100755 --- a/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild +++ b/source/n/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.SlackBuild @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ cd $(dirname $0) ; CWD=$(pwd) PKGNAM=wpa_supplicant VERSION=${VERSION:-$(echo $PKGNAM-*.tar.?z* | rev | cut -f 3- -d . | cut -f 1 -d - | rev)} -BUILD=${BUILD:-6} +BUILD=${BUILD:-3} SRCVERSION=$(printf $VERSION | tr _ -) @@ -85,29 +85,15 @@ find . \ \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \ -exec chmod 644 {} \; -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch.gz | patch -p1 || exit 1 - -# Fixup various paths in the dbus service file -zcat $CWD/patches/dbus-service-file-args.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 - -# Eliminate some logspam -zcat $CWD/patches/quiet-scan-results-message.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 - -# Apply a few other patches from Fedora -zcat $CWD/patches/assoc-timeout.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/patches/flush-debug-output.diff.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/patches/rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 -zcat $CWD/patches/rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 - -# Support OpenSSL-1.1.x: -zcat $CWD/patches/Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-assoc-timeout.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-dbus-service-file-args.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-flush-debug-output.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-quiet-scan-results-message.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 +zcat $CWD/patches/wpa_supplicant-2.7-fix-undefined-remove-ie.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 + +# Allow legacy tls to avoid breaking WPA2-Enterprise: +zcat $CWD/patches/allow-tlsv1.patch.gz | patch -p1 --verbose || exit 1 cd wpa_supplicant |