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From e9e4cb4ed045a12c984a367bee0ddcbb3f27ae0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2013
Subject: CVE-2013-1619 and CVE-2013-2116 [GNUTLS-SA-2013-1,GNUTLS-SA-2013-2]

Fix to avoid a timing attack in TLS CBC record parsing (aka Lucky 13). 

For background, see http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html

The fix for CVE-2013-2116 is folded into this patch since it addresses
a problem introduced by the fix for CVE-2013-1619.

This is a backport adaptation for use with GnuTLS 2.8.4.

Relevant upstream commits:
--------------------------
https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/458c67cf98740e
https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/93b7fcfa3297a9
https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/32a7367601a3fd
https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/63a331df6aa0ec

---
 gnutls_algorithms.c |   14 +++++
 gnutls_algorithms.h |    3 +
 gnutls_cipher.c     |  132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 gnutls_hash_int.h   |   21 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

--- a/lib/gnutls_cipher.c	2013-09-27
+++ b/lib/gnutls_cipher.c	2013-09-27
@@ -287,6 +287,26 @@ calc_enc_length (gnutls_session_t sessio
   return length;
 }
 
+#define PREAMBLE_SIZE 16
+static inline int make_preamble(opaque* uint64_data, opaque type, uint16_t c_length, opaque ver, opaque* preamble)
+{
+  opaque minor = _gnutls_version_get_minor (ver);
+  opaque major = _gnutls_version_get_major (ver);
+  opaque *p = preamble;
+  
+  memcpy(p, uint64_data, 8);
+  p+=8;
+  *p=type; p++;
+  if (_gnutls_version_has_variable_padding (ver))
+    {                  /* TLS 1.0 or higher */
+      *p = major; p++;
+      *p = minor; p++;
+    }
+  memcpy(p, &c_length, 2);
+  p+=2;
+  return p-preamble;
+}
+
 /* This is the actual encryption 
  * Encrypts the given compressed datum, and puts the result to cipher_data,
  * which has cipher_size size.
@@ -304,11 +324,11 @@ _gnutls_compressed2ciphertext (gnutls_se
   int length, ret;
   digest_hd_st td;
   uint8_t type = _type;
-  uint8_t major, minor;
+  opaque preamble[PREAMBLE_SIZE];
+  int preamble_size;
   int hash_size =
     _gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (session->security_parameters.
 			       write_mac_algorithm);
-  gnutls_protocol_t ver;
   int blocksize =
     _gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (session->security_parameters.
 				   write_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
@@ -316,40 +336,27 @@ _gnutls_compressed2ciphertext (gnutls_se
     _gnutls_cipher_is_block (session->security_parameters.
 			     write_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
   opaque *data_ptr;
-
-
-  ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
-  minor = _gnutls_version_get_minor (ver);
-  major = _gnutls_version_get_major (ver);
-
+  int ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
 
   /* Initialize MAC */
-  ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm,
-		  session->connection_state.write_mac_secret.data,
-		  session->connection_state.write_mac_secret.size, ver);
-
-  if (ret < 0
-      && session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
-    {
-      gnutls_assert ();
-      return ret;
-    }
 
   c_length = _gnutls_conv_uint16 (compressed.size);
 
   if (session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
     {				/* actually when the algorithm in not the NULL one */
-      _gnutls_hmac (&td,
-		    UINT64DATA (session->connection_state.
-				write_sequence_number), 8);
-
-      _gnutls_hmac (&td, &type, 1);
-      if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
-	{			/* TLS 1.0 or higher */
-	  _gnutls_hmac (&td, &major, 1);
-	  _gnutls_hmac (&td, &minor, 1);
-	}
-      _gnutls_hmac (&td, &c_length, 2);
+      digest_hd_st td;
+
+      ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.write_mac_algorithm,
+                 session->connection_state.write_mac_secret.data,
+                 session->connection_state.write_mac_secret.size, ver);
+
+      if (ret < 0)
+        {
+          gnutls_assert ();
+          return ret;
+        }
+      preamble_size = make_preamble( UINT64DATA (session->connection_state.write_sequence_number), type, c_length, ver, preamble);
+      _gnutls_hmac (&td, preamble, preamble_size);
       _gnutls_hmac (&td, compressed.data, compressed.size);
       mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
     }
@@ -418,6 +425,49 @@ _gnutls_compressed2ciphertext (gnutls_se
   return length;
 }
 
+static void dummy_wait(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_datum_t* plaintext, 
+                       unsigned pad_failed, unsigned int pad, unsigned total, int ver)
+{
+  /* this hack is only needed on CBC ciphers */
+  if (_gnutls_cipher_is_block (session->security_parameters.read_bulk_cipher_algorithm) == CIPHER_BLOCK)
+    {
+      uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
+      unsigned len;
+      digest_hd_st td;
+      int ret;
+
+      ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm,
+                      session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.data,
+                      session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.size, ver);
+
+      if (ret < 0)
+        return;
+
+      /* force an additional hash compression function evaluation to prevent timing 
+       * attacks that distinguish between wrong-mac + correct pad, from wrong-mac + incorrect pad.
+       */
+      if (pad_failed == 0 && pad > 0) 
+        {
+          len = _gnutls_get_hash_block_len(session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm);
+          if (len > 0)
+            {
+              /* This is really specific to the current hash functions.
+               * It should be removed once a protocol fix is in place.
+               */
+	      if ((pad+total) % len > len-9 && total % len <= len-9) 
+	        {
+	          if (len < plaintext->size)
+                    _gnutls_hmac (&td, plaintext->data, len);
+                  else
+                    _gnutls_hmac (&td, plaintext->data, plaintext->size);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+      mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
+    }
+}
+
 /* Deciphers the ciphertext packet, and puts the result to compress_data, of compress_size.
  * Returns the actual compressed packet size.
  */
@@ -429,38 +479,22 @@ _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_se
 {
   uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
   uint16_t c_length;
-  uint8_t pad;
+  unsigned int pad = 0;
   int length;
   digest_hd_st td;
   uint16_t blocksize;
   int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
-  uint8_t major, minor;
-  gnutls_protocol_t ver;
+  opaque preamble[PREAMBLE_SIZE];
+  int preamble_size = 0;
+  int ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
   int hash_size =
     _gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (session->security_parameters.
 			       read_mac_algorithm);
 
-  ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
-  minor = _gnutls_version_get_minor (ver);
-  major = _gnutls_version_get_major (ver);
-
   blocksize =
     _gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (session->security_parameters.
 				   read_bulk_cipher_algorithm);
 
-  /* initialize MAC 
-   */
-  ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm,
-		  session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.data,
-		  session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.size, ver);
-
-  if (ret < 0
-      && session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
-    {
-      gnutls_assert ();
-      return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
   /* actual decryption (inplace)
    */
   switch (_gnutls_cipher_is_block
@@ -508,31 +542,25 @@ _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_se
	  gnutls_assert ();
	  return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
	}
-      pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1;	/* pad */
-
-      if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)
-	{
-	  gnutls_assert ();
-	  _gnutls_record_log
-	    ("REC[%p]: Short record length %d > %d - %d (under attack?)\n",
-	     session, pad, ciphertext.size, hash_size);
-	  /* We do not fail here. We check below for the
-	   * the pad_failed. If zero means success.
-	   */
-	  pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
-	}
-
-      length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad;
-
-      /* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
+      pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1];	/* pad */
+      if (pad+1 > ciphertext.size-hash_size)
+        pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+
+      /* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x).
+       * Note that we access all 256 bytes of ciphertext for padding check
+       * because there is a timing channel in that memory access (in certain CPUs
        */
       if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1 && pad_failed == 0)
 	for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
 	  {
-	    if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
-		ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
+            if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] != pad)
 	      pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
 	  }
+ 
+      if (pad_failed)
+        pad = 0;
+      length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad - 1;
+
       break;
     default:
       gnutls_assert ();
@@ -548,17 +576,20 @@ _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_se
    */
   if (session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
     {
-      _gnutls_hmac (&td,
-		    UINT64DATA (session->connection_state.
-				read_sequence_number), 8);
-
-      _gnutls_hmac (&td, &type, 1);
-      if (ver >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
-	{			/* TLS 1.x */
-	  _gnutls_hmac (&td, &major, 1);
-	  _gnutls_hmac (&td, &minor, 1);
-	}
-      _gnutls_hmac (&td, &c_length, 2);
+      digest_hd_st td;
+
+      ret = mac_init (&td, session->security_parameters.read_mac_algorithm,
+                 session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.data,
+                 session->connection_state.read_mac_secret.size, ver);
+
+      if (ret < 0)
+        {
+          gnutls_assert ();
+          return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+      preamble_size = make_preamble( UINT64DATA (session->connection_state.read_sequence_number), type, c_length, ver, preamble);
+      _gnutls_hmac (&td, preamble, preamble_size);
 
       if (length > 0)
 	_gnutls_hmac (&td, ciphertext.data, length);
@@ -566,16 +597,14 @@ _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_se
       mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
     }
 
-  /* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
-   * 1.0 protocol.
-   */
-  if (pad_failed != 0)
-    return pad_failed;
-
   /* HMAC was not the same. 
    */
-  if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0)
+  if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0 || pad_failed != 0)
     {
+      gnutls_datum_t compressed = {compress_data, compress_size};
+      /* HMAC was not the same. */
+      dummy_wait(session, &compressed, pad_failed, pad, length+preamble_size, ver);
+
       gnutls_assert ();
       return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
     }
--- a/lib/gnutls_hash_int.h	2013-09-27
+++ b/lib/gnutls_hash_int.h	2013-09-27
@@ -92,4 +92,25 @@ void _gnutls_mac_deinit_ssl3_handshake (
 
 int _gnutls_hash_copy (digest_hd_st* dst_handle, digest_hd_st * src_handle);
 
+/* We shouldn't need to know that, but a work-around in decoding
+ * TLS record padding requires that.
+ */
+inline static size_t
+_gnutls_get_hash_block_len (gnutls_digest_algorithm_t algo)
+{
+  switch (algo)
+    {
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_MD5:
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1:
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160:
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256:
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384:
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512:
+    case GNUTLS_DIG_SHA224:
+      return 64;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+    }
+}
+
 #endif /* GNUTLS_HASH_INT_H */
--- a/lib/gnutls_algorithms.c	2013-09-27
+++ b/lib/gnutls_algorithms.c	2013-09-27
@@ -1185,6 +1185,20 @@ _gnutls_version_is_supported (gnutls_ses
     return 1;
 }
 
+/* This function determines if the version specified can have
+   non-minimal padding. */
+int _gnutls_version_has_variable_padding (gnutls_protocol_t version)
+{
+  switch(version) {
+  case GNUTLS_TLS1_0:
+  case GNUTLS_TLS1_1:
+  case GNUTLS_TLS1_2:
+    return 1;
+  default:
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
 /* Type to KX mappings */
 gnutls_kx_algorithm_t
 _gnutls_map_kx_get_kx (gnutls_credentials_type_t type, int server)
--- a/lib/gnutls_algorithms.h	2013-09-27
+++ b/lib/gnutls_algorithms.h	2013-09-27
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ int _gnutls_version_get_major (gnutls_pr
 int _gnutls_version_get_minor (gnutls_protocol_t ver);
 gnutls_protocol_t _gnutls_version_get (int major, int minor);
 
+/* Functions for feature checks */
+int _gnutls_version_has_variable_padding (gnutls_protocol_t version);
+
 /* Functions for MACs. */
 int _gnutls_mac_is_ok (gnutls_mac_algorithm_t algorithm);
 gnutls_mac_algorithm_t _gnutls_x509_oid2mac_algorithm (const char *oid);